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PERSISTENCE OF, AND INTERRELATION BETWEEN,  
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine how and to what extent the propensity to be engaged in alliances with different 
partner types (suppliers, customers and competitors) depends on prior alliance engagement with 
partner firms of the same type (persistence) and prior engagement in alliances with the other 
partner types (interrelation). We derive hypotheses from a combined competence and governance 
view of collaboration, and test these on an extensive panel dataset of innovation-active Dutch 
firms during 1996-2004. We find persistence in alliance engagement of all three types of 
partners, but customer alliances are more persistent than supplier alliances. Most persistent are 
joint supplier and customer alliances, which we attribute to the advantages of value chain 
integration in innovation processes. Positive interrelation also exists in vertical alliances, as 
immediate past customer alliances increase the propensity to engage in supplier alliances and 
vice versa. On the other hand, while prior engagement in horizontal (competitor) alliances 
increases the propensity to engage in vertical alliances, this effect only occurs with a longer lag. 
Overall, our findings are highly supportive of the idea that alliance engagement with different 
partner types is heterogeneous but interrelated. Our analysis suggests that the inter-temporal 
relationship between different types of alliances may be as important as their simultaneous 
relationship in alliance portfolios.  
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PERSISTENCE OF, AND INTERRELATION BETWEEN,  
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Already for over two decades strategic alliances and networks of inter-firm relations have 
been a ubiquitous phenomenon (e.g. Hagedoorn, 2002; Contractor and Lorange, 2002). There is 
a growing consensus in the literature that a firm’s involvement in inter-firm technology alliances 
matters for its economic and innovative performance (Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell et al., 1996; 
Ahuja 2000a; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). Research on alliances has initially focused on the 
questions ‘why’ and ‘when’ alliances are formed (Duysters et al., 2001; Kogut and Zander, 1993; 
Powell and Brantley, 1992). Interdependence and resource complementarities have been 
addressed here as the most common explanation for the formation of inter-organizational ties 
(Richardson, 1972; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Harrison et al., 
2001). The literature has since broadened significantly  and saw the emergence of two streams of 
research that have focused in particular on interrelationships between alliances of focal firms. 
The alliance network literature has focused on the question with which individual partner firms 
tie up, and the role of network embeddedness and network structural properties herein (e.g. 
Gulati, 1995a, 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Chung et al., 2000). This literature has 
demonstrated that collaboration with specific partners tends to be highly persistent, but has 
abstracted from the role of partner attributes and resource complementarities. The alliance 
portfolio view, on the other hand, has focused on potential complementarities between alliances 
as they bring in different sets of knowledge or complementary capabilities (Lavie, 2007; Vassolo 
et al, 2004; Lokshin and Duijsters, 2008). This literature has shown that the role of partner 
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attributes is as important as the role of networks’ structural properties (Lavie, 2007; Faems et al, 
2005; Belderbos et al, 2004a). 
 Despite the broadening of the alliance literature and the notion that collaboration with 
different types of partners is driven by different motives and characterized by different risks and 
corresponding needs for control (Parkhe, 1993), little attention has been paid to the differences 
and interrelation between alliances with different partner types. Whereas the alliance portfolio 
view has examined how potential complementarities between different alliances affect firm 
performance, the literature has focused on specific subsets of partner attributes, such as their 
relative bargaining power (Lavie, 2007), degree of foreignness (Lavie and Miller, forthcoming; 
Lokshin and Duysters, 2008), or their specific technology domain (Vassolo et al, 2004). In this 
paper, we develop a broader view on differences in partner attributes by differentiating among 
partner types based on the different roles they play in complementing a firm’s own resources and 
capabilities. More specifically, we distinguish between alliances with suppliers and/or customers 
(vertical collaboration) and alliances with competitors (horizontal collaboration), within a 
context of technological collaboration.  
 Vertical and horizontal collaboration are likely to serve different strategic purposes, which 
may carry differential implications for a firm’s strategic proclivity to be engaged in each type of 
collaboration. Whereas vertical inter-firm relations are seen as spanning differentiated 
organizations that combine symbiotically to achieve collective ends, horizontal inter-firm 
relations span similar organizations that combine commensalistically to achieve collective ends 
(Baum and Ingram, 2002; Tidd et al., 2005). The objectives and performance effects of vertical 
alliances have also been found to differ from those of horizontal alliance with the latter 
frequently focusing on more radical innovations and the former on cost reduction or reduce time 
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to market (Belderbos et al, 2004a; 2004b; Tether, 2002). Although both types of collaboration 
have been subject of investigation in prior research, two streams of literature appear to have 
developed in relative isolation. In the literature on technology alliances, most studies have not 
made an explicit distinction between types of alliance partners or have restricted analysis to 
horizontal alliances within an industry (Hagedoorn, 1993; Mowery et al., 1996, 1998; Rowley et 
al., 2000; Ahuja, 2000a, 2000b; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Bae and Garguilo, 2003; 
Sampson, 2007). In contrast, the supply chain literature has largely focused on vertical alliances 
with suppliers or customers (Lee et al., 1997; Metters, 1997; Narashimhan and Jayaram, 1998; 
Rosenzweig et al., 2003; Vickery et al., 2003). Implicitly, both approaches assume that alliances 
with different types of partners are unrelated. 
 In this paper, we examine the persistence of, and interrelation between, engagement in 
alliances with the three different types of partners, with an application to technology alliances. 
We anticipate different propensities to be engaged, and persist, in collaboration with different 
partner types. This focus on the more strategic decision to engage in collaboration with a specific 
partner type complements the alliance network literature, which has examined the relationship 
between network characteristics and persistence but has focused on alliance formation with  
individual partner firms (e.g. Podolny, 1994; Gulati, 1995a, 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; 
Chung et al., 2000). Second, we contribute to the literature by specifically examining to what 
extent engagement in alliances with different partner types is interrelated, i.e. to what extent 
collaboration with one partner type enhances the propensity to be engaged in collaboration with 
another type. We argue that there are various reasons for such interrelations and in this way aim 
to contribute to a better understanding of dependencies across alliances with different partner 
types, an understudied subject in the literature until now (Lavie, 2007). 
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 In order to understand persistence in, and interrelation between, engagement in technology 
alliances of these structural types, we combine competence and governance views of 
collaboration. Whereas a number of recent studies have combined both views in view of 
developing a more integrative theory of the firm that contributes to a better understanding of 
optimal firm boundaries (Argyres, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Williamson, 1999; Leiblein 
and Miller, 2003; Jacobides and Hitt, 2005), this approach has not been applied to the analysis of 
strategic collaboration. While there has been a focus on the competence side in most of the 
alliance literature until now, the governance side has been recognized but remains understudied 
(Das and Teng, 2000; Reuer and Arino, 2002; Nooteboom, 2004a; Sampson, 2007). This is 
somewhat surprising as previous research has shown that interorganizational hazards are 
especially present in alliances involving technology (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Therefore, we 
argue that the combination of both views is required as they provide complementary perspectives 
on the strategic choices driving persistence of and interrelationships between alliances with 
different partner types. 
 We test hypotheses on a comprehensive panel dataset on innovating firms in the 
Netherlands, 1996-2004. We empirically examine the propensity of firms to be engaged in 
supplier, customer, and competitor alliances, and relate this to their engagement in these types of 
alliances in prior years. Persistence in this context is defined as the degree to which prior 
involvement in an alliance type predicts current involvement. This approach follows the 
definition of persistence as 'state dependence' (e.g. Heckman, 1981) and earlier work on the 
persistence in profits (Mueller, 1986), innovation (Raymond et al, 2009) or other measures of 
firm performance such as Tobin’s q (e.g. Villalonga, 2004). In contrast to most previous 
empirical work that relied on alliance press reports, we use official statistical survey data drawn 
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from the harmonized European Community Innovation Survey. An important advantage of this 
source is the fact that repeated observations are included on the same firms over longer periods 
(e.g. 6-10 years), making the data very suitable for analysis of persistence in alliance strategies. 
Another advantage is the diversity of firms included in the data: both large R&D intensive firms 
as well as small and medium sized enterprises are included, and the data cover a wide spectrum 
of industries. Hence, use of this dataset avoids the problem of oversampling of large firms and 
the lack of systematic information on alliance disbandment, which has hampered prior research 
using data on alliance announcements (Schilling, 2009). On the other hand, we note the 
limitations of this extensive longitudinal dataset in that it does not reveal identities of individual 
partner firms or the number of alliances of each type. For our purpose, the analysis of the 
propensity of alliance engagement with specific partner types, these drawbacks pose fewer 
problems.1 
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework and 
derives hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variables and methods. Section 4 presents the 
results and section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 A competence view of collaboration draws on resource-based theory which emphasizes the 
development of valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources as the basis for 
competitive advantage and superior innovation performance (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). 
The resource-based view has traditionally focused on a firm’s internal resource base. It has been 
also recognized that external collaboration can contribute to the development of a unique 
resource base (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
                                                 
1
 We discuss the limitations of the data and our approach in the concluding section. 
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Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007). Alliances enable firms to access and (re)combine external 
knowledge and to leverage complementary assets (Teece, 1992; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 
1994; Powell et al., 1996; Das and Teng, 2000). Furthermore, a competence view of 
collaboration singles out the types of resources and capabilities that can be exchanged and 
possibly reconfigured by means of collaboration (Nooteboom, 2004a). Deployment of this 
perspective enables us to identify to what extent resources and capabilities as held by suppliers, 
customers and competitors differ in providing complementarity resources and capabilities to the 
focal firm and how this may carry implications for persistence of and interrelation between 
vertical and horizontal types of alliances. 2  
 A complementary perspective is formed by a governance view of collaboration, which 
points to the role of collaborative hazards such as risks of undesirable knowledge spillovers and 
free-ridership in collaborative exchange of resources and capabilities. This may give rise to 
opportunism by partners, diminishing the possibilities to appropriate returns to innovation 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Nooteboom, 2004a; Lui and Ngo, 2004; Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). 
Obviously, knowledge spillovers to competitors are considered far more risky than to suppliers 
and/or customers (Ahuja, 2000a). A governance view sheds some more light on the extent to 
which partner types differ in their risk profiles, which will carry implications for persistence of 
and interrelation between horizontal and vertical alliances.  
 In developing our hypotheses, we draw on these two theoretical frameworks. We first 
develop a baseline hypothesis on the persistence of collaboration with each specific type: with 
suppliers, customers or competitors. We then develop hypotheses that specify to what degree 
                                                 
2
 Although we argue that firms engage in persistence of alliance strategies because it brings certain strategic 
benefits, this does not imply that such persistence will always carry positive performance effects. As recently 
demonstrated, there may also be a downside to persistence in collaboration in case the external environment changes 
in radical ways (Koka and Prescott, 2008). 
11 
 
 
 
persistence differs between alliances with different partner types as well as on how engagement 
in alliances with one partner type affects the propensity to be engaged in alliances with another 
partner type.  
 
Baseline hypothesis: persistence of supplier, customer and competitor alliances  
 Collaboration with suppliers can help firms achieve competitive advantage by realizing 
higher process efficiencies (Saeed et al., 2005) and by reducing costs and increasing the speed of 
implementing new product introductions (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1994). Moreover, 
collaboration with suppliers enables a firm to maintain its focus on strengthening core 
competences and technology development, and to secure access to key inputs (Suzuki, 1993; 
Kamath and Liker, 1994). Collaboration may also create additional opportunities for the build-up 
of valuable, specific and difficult to imitate resources and competences, shared between a firm 
and its suppliers (Tidd et al., 2005). This may provide a focal firm with an opportunity to direct 
suppliers’ development efforts and shape their (technological) competences (Ragatz et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, by engaging in collaboration with suppliers, a focal firm can also build up a strong 
reputation as a reliable and attractive partner to suppliers, thus reducing the risk of opportunistic 
behavior and negative referrals or lock-out from future collaborative opportunities (Ireland et al., 
2002; Nooteboom, 2004b). Through these processes, collaboration with suppliers is likely to 
provide a focal firm with additional opportunities for collaboration with existing and/or new 
suppliers, increasing its propensity of engagement in technology collaboration of this type. 
Overall, these arguments suggest persistence of collaboration with suppliers. 
  Collaboration with customers may enable firms to source leads on new or adapted 
products and to reduce risks of uncertainty associated with market introduction of new products 
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(von Hippel, 1988; Schmookler, 1966). In this way, collaboration with customers may be 
essential in ensuring market expansion when input by customers for introduction of new 
products and/or adaptation of existing products is required (Littler, Leverick and Bruce, 1995; 
Tether, 2002). For customers, such collaboration may be attractive because they may be able to 
steer the development of competences and routines within the focal firm to their advantage 
(Ragatz et al., 1997). For the focal firm, alliances with customers may provide it with a better 
understanding of its customers’ current needs and/or future (unmet) needs (Aaker, 1996; Tidd et 
al., 2005). In particular if customers are lead-users, their needs may be indicative of a (large) 
future mass market (Von Hippel, 1988). The more a focal firm replicates ties with customers, the 
more it can build up shared and unique capabilities that are required for the realization of shorter 
lead times, improved quality and greater flexibility, resulting in improved efficiency, 
innovativeness and market responsiveness (Choi and Hartely, 1996; Fisher, 1997; Childerhouse 
et al., 2002; Rosenzweig et al., 2003; Tidd et al., 2005). In addition, the general argument holds 
that by engaging in collaboration with customers, a focal firm can develop and nurture 
capabilities to collaborate with this type of partner and to build up a strong reputation as a 
reliable and attractive partner (Ireland et al., 2002; Duysters et al., 2007a; 2007b). This is likely 
to provide a focal firm with additional opportunities for collaboration with existing and/or new 
customers, increasing its propensity to be engaged in this type of collaboration. These arguments 
suggest persistence of collaboration with customers. 
 In line with the commensalistic nature of the collaboration, technology alliances with 
competitors tend to focus on research trajectories that precede application in the competitive 
arena (Baum and Ingram, 2002). In this way, horizontal collaboration may contribute to a firm’s 
future competitiveness in domains that are currently non-core. Research consortia, for example, 
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fall into this category where competitors work together in order to share the costs and risks of 
research, pool scare expertise and equipment and aim to develop far-from-market technology 
with generic application potential (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Tidd et al., 2005). Although the 
realization of a completely new technology may require a longer time horizon, firms can reap 
collaborative benefits immediately by learning from their competitors’ specific expertise 
(Sampson, 2007). To this end a sufficient degree of trust is required that facilitates the exchange 
of more tacit knowledge and reduces the risk of hold-up and free-ridership that may be present in 
horizontal collaboration (Park and Russo, 1996; Nooteboom, 2004b; Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005). 
Collaboration with competitors may signal that a company is not only technologically competent 
but also trustworthy (Lui and Ngo, 2004). In addition, collaboration with competitors enables a 
focal firm to develop and nurture capabilities to collaborate with this type of partner and to gain 
a reputation of being experienced and reliable in horizontal collaboration (Ireland et al., 2002; 
Duysters et al., 2007a; 2007b). This suggests persistence of collaboration with competitors, as 
prior collaboration increases the opportunities to the focal firm for future collaboration with 
existing and/or new competitors. 
 The above arguments suggest persistence of technology collaboration with each type of 
partner, i.e. suppliers, customers and competitors. This leads to our baseline hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Previous engagement in alliances with a specific type of partner (customer, 
supplier, and competitor) increases the propensity to be engaged in alliances with that type of 
partner. 
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Differences in persistence between supplier and customer alliances  
 When considering vertical collaboration more in-depth, we anticipate persistence of 
collaboration with customers to be stronger relative to collaboration with suppliers. Here, a 
competence perspective suggests that demand-pull forces tend to be more important as 
determinants of innovative activities (Dosi, 1988; Dosi et al., 1990; Von Hippel, 1988). When 
suppliers are engaged in the innovation process, a more temporary and sometimes ad-hoc type of 
collaboration may be more appropriate, with a clearly focused and project-based form 
(Andersen, 1999). Collaboration with customers is generally considered to be useful throughout 
the entire innovation process (Dosi, 1988; Von Hippel, 1988). This applies both to its early 
phases in which collaboration with lead users can provide firms with access to novel ideas that 
may be indicative of a (large) future market (Von Hippel, 1978) and to its later phases with their 
emphasis on gaining market acceptance for the new innovation and stimulating its wider 
diffusion (Dosi et al., 1990; Tidd et al., 2005). This suggests stronger persistence of customer 
collaboration in comparison with supplier collaboration.  
 From a governance perspective, collaboration with suppliers may lead these to become 
more qualified and hence more attractive as partners to competitors, potentially enabling the 
latter to free ride on the investments made by the focal firm (Park and Russo, 1996; Nooteboom 
2004a; Mesquita et al., 2008). Although this risk can be reduced by partnership exclusive 
arrangements and relational governance between the focal firm and its supplier(s) (Zaheer and 
Venkataraman, 1995; Mesquita et al., 2008), this may not be sufficient to enhance persistence of 
collaboration with suppliers. For a focal firm, an increasing dependence on collaboration on, and 
risk of knowledge spillovers through, suppliers will increase the inclination to consider 
alternatives to collaboration, such as internal procurement and market procurement (Gulati et al., 
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2005). Hence, whereas persistence of collaboration with suppliers may be attractive for the focal 
firm, the risk of spillovers and its corresponding remedial measures may reduce this propensity. 
Although the risk of spillovers can also be present in collaboration with customers, these may be 
outweighed by the strategic value of access to (scarce) information on specific customer needs 
and the higher likelihood of initial market acceptance and (future) commercial success.  
  Both from a competence and a governance perspective, the above arguments suggest 
stronger persistence of customer collaboration when compared with supplier collaboration, 
leading to our second hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Engagement in customer alliances is more persistent than engagement in supplier 
alliances. 
 
The relationship between supplier and customer alliances  
Supplier and customer alliances engagement are also likely to be interrelated. Vertical 
collaboration with suppliers and customers implies the bridging of three value steps along a 
value chain. By its nature, a value chain entails a highly systemic division of labor where change 
in one value step may have far-reaching implications for adjacent value steps – upstream and/or 
downstream (Porter, 1980). As a consequence, new product innovations or process 
improvements need to be well coordinated in order to mitigate risks of (major) inconsistencies 
across two or more value steps as well as to ensure their timely commercialization and/or 
implementation (Diez-Vial, 2007). In addition, vertical collaboration may also facilitate the 
reduction or elimination of operational inefficiencies along a value chain such as, for example, 
those resulting from ‘bullwhip’ effects due to demand variability (Metters, 1997; Lee et al., 
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1997; Gulati and Sytch, 2007). In this way, collaboration with both types of chain partners 
supports firms to develop product innovations and/or implement process improvements in a more 
rapid, cost effective and integral manner (Choi and Hartely, 1996; Fisher, 1997; Childerhouse et 
al., 2002; Rosenzweig et al., 2003). Accomplishing these objectives induces a need for firms to 
act in tune. This may be realized by creating a degree of alignment between collaboration with 
suppliers and customers. Such alignment implies that alliances with suppliers and customers are 
not pursued in isolation but rather that collaboration with one type leads to collaboration with the 
other.  
The strongest alignment can be achieved through simultaneous vertical collaboration with 
suppliers and customers, and this may carry additional advantages. It offers the possibility for 
direct knowledge exchange and real-time coordination among all three types of partners. This 
further reduces the risk of inconsistencies across value steps, improves efficiency by elimination 
of duplicative efforts and decreases chances of misunderstanding. In addition, it allows for the 
exchange of more specific, fine-grained information that may contribute to the build-up of shared 
innovation-based capabilities and routines that become difficult to imitate for others (Ragatz et 
al., 1997). Through simultaneous collaboration, suppliers may get more exact information on 
specific needs of their customers’ customers, which is critical for the successful realization of 
product innovations (Echols and Tsai, 2005). In addition, such information may enable suppliers 
to allocate scarce resources more efficiently to those domains that carry clear commercial 
potential. Likewise, from the perspective of customers, collaboration with the focal firm may 
secure access to vital knowledge and specialized capabilities as held by key suppliers that 
cooperate with the focal firm. In this way, suppliers and customers may form an important 
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(indirect) source of information and of economic value to each other, making simultaneous 
collaboration also attractive from their point of view.  
 Combining collaboration with suppliers and customers may also be attractive from a 
governance perspective. The connection that the focal firm forms between its suppliers and 
customers reduces room for conflict and opportunism as it offers the possibility of threatening to 
pass on information on opportunistic behavior to the other partner(s). Reduced risks of conflict 
and relational hazards increase stability of the collaboration and provide a basis for the build-up 
of trust (Nooteboom, 2004b). This solidifies vertical coordination and knowledge exchange, 
which increases the likelihood that shared innovation-based capabilities and routines remain 
difficult to imitate (Gulati and Sytch, 2007). In this way, simultaneous vertical collaboration can 
yield a continuous supply of new opportunities for innovation and value creation, securing 
competitive advantage in core domains (Porter, 1980; Dyer and Singh, 2000; Priem and Butlers, 
2001; Gulati and Sytch, 2007). This is consistent with the finding in the operations management 
literature suggesting that firms persistently engaging in vertical, value chain spanning 
collaboration with suppliers and customers can achieve superior performance (Narasimhan and 
Jayaram, 1998; Vickery et al., 2003; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Rosenzweig et al., 2003).  
 Based on the above arguments, we arrive at two predictions regarding the relationship 
between suppliers and customers alliances. First, the benefits of alignment between supplier and 
customer collaboration suggest that firms that have been engaged in an alliance with one of the 
chain partners will have a greater propensity to be engaged in collaboration with the other 
vertical chain partner. Second, the advantages of joint supplier customer collaboration suggest 
that firms that are engaged in simultaneous collaboration with suppliers and customers have 
strong reasons to persist in such joint collaboration. The advantages relative to pursing one type 
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of collaboration in isolation suggest that this persistence is greater than persistence in alliances 
with suppliers or customers. This leads to the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Previous engagement in supplier alliances increases the propensity to be engaged 
in customer alliances, and vice versa.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Simultaneous engagement in alliances with suppliers and customers is more 
persistent than engagement in alliances with suppliers or customers. 
 
The relationship between horizontal and vertical alliances 
 Vertical collaboration is generally considered to be particularly well suited for deepening 
existing competences and optimizing an established value chain (Tripsas, 1997; Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1995). In this way, vertical collaboration offers room for the build-up and 
strengthening of competitive advantage in core domains, such as new product innovations, 
reduced development time and efficiency gains. However, it is considered to be less well suited 
for the creation of new, state-of-the-art technology (Tidd et al., 2005). For that purpose, 
horizontal alliances are likely to be better equipped given their general focus on pre-competitive 
development of far-from-market technology with wide(r) application potential (Teece, 1980; 
Hagedoorn, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2006; Tether, 2002; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). This may 
form the basis for a focal firm’s future competitive advantage in non-core domains, securing 
continuity on the long term. Prior studies on the performance effects of alliances with different 
partner types has confirmed that alliances with competitors are often most effective for the 
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generation of new-to-the-market products, while supplier and customer alliance tend to impact 
on productivity growth and product improvements (Belderbos et al, 2004a; Faems et. al, 2005).  
 A competence perspective suggests substantial benefits of combining horizontal and 
vertical technology collaboration strategies. Horizontal technology-based collaboration may 
provide firms with access to scarce, external expertise on promising new technologies, and allow 
for the exchange of knowledge between partners that stimulate learning and facilitate its further 
recombination (Ahuja, 2000b). Such recombinatory efforts may lead to the creation of 
technologies with a high novelty value, yielding potential to generate future revenue streams 
(Sampson, 2007; Gilsing et al., 2008). However, to realize such future business opportunities 
requires successful commercialization and/or implementation of the newly created technology. 
Vertical collaboration with suppliers and/or customers is generally better suited for that purpose 
(Choi and Hartely, 1996; Fisher, 1997; Childerhouse et al., 2002; Rosenzweig et al., 2003; King 
et al., 2003; Tidd et al., 2005), and can usefully complement horizontal collaboration.  
 In contrast, a governance view on collaboration highlights the risk of undesirable 
knowledge spillovers and free-ridership, especially in case of collaboration with competitors. 
Due to comparable knowledge bases and competences, competitors may have a greater capacity 
for absorption and appropriation of knowledge spillovers, creating a temptation for free-ridership 
(Park and Russo, 1996; Khanna et al., 1998; Nooteboom, 2004b; Phelps, 2009). This also implies 
that simultaneous horizontal and vertical collaboration increases the likelihood that specific 
knowledge of a focal firm, as developed with its customer(s) and/or supplier(s), may spill over to 
its horizontal partners. Since horizontal partners are likely to figure as a firm’s (future) 
competitors in downstream markets, knowledge spillovers may erode its competitive advantage 
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(Ahuja, 2000a). In particular if the technology alliance is in the focal firm’s core domains, this 
may severely damage its competitiveness and threaten its short term profits. 
 In sum, a governance perspective suggests important risks and drawbacks of combining 
vertical and horizontal technology alliances, while the competence perspective highlights the 
potential complementarity between the two strategies. However, the arguments above also 
suggest that the two perspectives can perhaps be reconciled. The governance risks are foremost 
an issue if the two types of collaboration overlap in time, such that the focal firm functions as the 
bridge between competitors and vertical partners. At the same time, the positive relationship 
suggested by the competence view leaves open the possibility of reaping the benefits by 
combining horizontal and vertical collaboration in a more consecutive manner. Established 
insights from the innovation and (product) life cycle literature provide such arguments for 
consecutive alignment benefits where it concerns the transition from horizontal to vertical 
alliances.  
 In this literature, it is argued that an initial focus on exploration, with its emphasis on 
creativity and small-scale experimentation, makes room for a focus on exploitation characterized 
by a focus on efficiency and (large scale) commercialization (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Seen in this light, horizontal 
alliances may be particularly well suited for exploration while vertical alliances may be 
considered as especially useful for exploitation. The literature on exploitation and exploration 
has suggested that these may then be optimally combined through a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
strategy, combining exploration and exploitation through some form of temporal separation 
between the two activities (Burgelman, 2002; Levinthal and March, 1993; Gupta et al., 2006). In 
contrast, the alternative strategy of ‘ambidexterity’ formed by organizational separation between 
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the two activities at the same point in time will not mitigate the governance risks of combining 
the two types of alliances (Burgelman, 1991; Gupta et al., 2006). Moreover, temporal separation 
does not need to be harmful from a competence perspective. On the contrary, it can enhance the 
explorative nature of horizontal collaboration by providing seclusion from current markets and 
established practices. In this way, more room is offered to maneuver and experiment freely and 
to obtain novel inspiration and insights from new and disruptive developments that typically 
emerge beyond the boundaries of an established industry (Geels, 2003). Simultaneous 
collaboration with customers and/or suppliers in this case may hamper this and may increase the 
risk of missing out on such newly emerging key trends in new technologies (Gilsing, 2005).      
 The transition from exploration to exploitation occurs once the new technology has been 
developed and prototypes start to become available, after which the phase of commercialization 
starts. This tends to be a lengthy and rather complex process as (new) customers need to become 
involved and a (new) supply chain needs to be developed (Hobday et al., 2000). The more 
radical or disruptive the new technology, the more important subsequent involvement of 
customers and/or suppliers becomes and the more collaboration shifts from regular partnerships 
to processes of intensive co-development (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Bozdogan et al., 1998; 
Callahan and Lasry, 2004).  
 Overall, the arguments above suggest that engagement in horizontal collaboration will 
increase the propensity to engage in vertical collaboration over time. This intertemporal 
relationship will be characterized by a sufficient lag between the two alliance strategies in order 
to allow for a sequence of discovery and experimentation in horizontal collaboration followed by 
upscaling and commercialization in vertical collaboration. In addition, this lag must not be too 
long for sacrificing many of the competence-based benefits but should be sufficient to mitigate 
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governance risks. These considerations on intertemporal relations between horizontal and 
vertical alliances do not play a role in the case of interrelation between supplier and customer 
alliances. In contrast, a longer lag in this case can cause a delay that inhibits the alignment of 
collaboration with suppliers and customers that is required for accomplishing the strategic 
objectives of vertical collaboration. Hence, the arguments above predict that compared with the 
supplier-customer alliance interrelationship (cf. Hypothesis 3), the effect of prior horizontal 
alliance engagement on the propensity to engage in vertical alliances is subject to a greater delay. 
This leads to our final hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Previous engagement in alliances with competitors increases the propensity to be 
engaged in alliances with suppliers and/or customers, but with a longer lag compared to the 
interrelationship between supplier and customer alliances.  
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 The empirical analysis uses a panel data set constructed from five consecutive European 
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) conducted in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in the Netherlands. The sampling methodology and the 
harmonized questionnaire are described in the OECD Oslo Manual (OECD, 1997).3 It has been 
only recently that researchers have been able to utilize consecutive CIS surveys, allowing the 
investigation of persistence in technological collaboration. The CIS surveys contain data 
concerning R&D expenditures and innovation activities of the firm, and engagement in 
collaborative technology development distinguished by partner type. The technology alliances in 
                                                 
3
 See also Laursen and Salter (2005) for a discussion of the UK version of Community Innovation Survey. 
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the survey relate to joint development efforts and collaboration on R&D, and can be seen as 
representing stronger forms of interaction between the firms, The CIS surveys are sent to all 
large firms and to a random sample of smaller firms comprising ten or more employees. The 
surveys contain the full range of questionnaire items for these firms indicating that they are 
active in innovation. The sample of innovation active firms across a wide range of industries and 
firm sizes is an appropriate one for our study. Since we are interested in the persistence of 
technology alliances, our analysis naturally is confined to firms engaging in innovative activities 
for which technology collaboration is relevant. We created the panel data set by merging the 
records of the innovation active firms in the five consecutive surveys, using the identification 
code of establishments from the Central Bureau of Statistics. The panel data set includes 4632 on 
3181 innovating firms from a wide range of sectors. Each firm is observed at least in three 
consecutive survey years, as this is required to examine persistence in our empirical model. 
Given the partially random sampling in each year for smaller firms, we do not often observe each 
firm for the entire period (1996-2004) and the panel is unbalanced in nature. A subset of 300 
firms is covered in the surveys in each of the years, i.e. data for all the variables used in the 
estimation are available in 5 surveys for a total of 10 years. For 851 firms data are available in 4 
consecutive surveys for a total of 8 years and 2030 firms are observed in 3 surveys for a total of 
6 years. In the empirical analysis the following industries are used with their standard industrial 
classification code (NACE) in parentheses: food, beverages and tobacco (15-16), textile, apparel 
and leather (17-19), Paper and paper products (21), printing (22), Oil (23), chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals (24), rubber products and plastics (25), non-metallic products and basic metals 
(26-27), fabricated metal products (28), machines and equipment (29), electrical products (30-
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33), motor vehicles (34-35), other manufacturing (36-37), construction (45), wholesalers and 
repair 50-52),  communication services (60-64), and business services (70-74). 
 
Variable construction 
 The CIS surveys ask the question if the firm had any cooperation arrangements on 
innovation activities with other firms in the last 2 years. Cooperation agreements are then 
differentiated by the type of partner such as customers, suppliers, and competitors. Based on this 
question, we create three dependent variables taking the value one if a firm reported to be 
engaged in a particular type of alliance, i.e. customer, supplier or competitor, and zero 
otherwise4. We also construct as a dependent variable ‘joint customer and supplier alliance’, 
taking the value one if the firm engaged in both these types of alliances in order to test for 
Hypothesis 3, for which we estimate a separate model. We define persistence as the degree to 
which prior involvement in alliances with a specific partner type predicts current involvement in 
such alliances. This approach follows the definition of persistence as 'state dependence' (e.g. 
Heckman, 1981), which in our context means that being engaged in past alliance activities 
increases the probability to be engaged in these activities currently. A similar approach has been 
used to analyze persistence in profits (Mueller, 1986), innovation (Raymond et al, 2009) or other 
measures of firm performance such as Tobin’s q (Villalonga, 2004): in these studies the ‘current 
state’ of a firm (in terms of strategy or performance) is similarly related to ‘past states’ in the 
same dimension to establish persistence. We examine persistence and interrelation by including 
as covariates dummy variables for past technology alliances, measuring engagement in 
technology alliances as reported in the previous surveys conducted two and four years earlier. 
                                                 
4
 It is possible that especially large firms have multiple technology alliances of a particular alliance type. The CIS 
surveys however do not contain information on the number of alliances per type.  
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While the coefficients on prior involvement in the same type of alliance indicate persistence, the 
coefficients on prior involvement in the other two types of alliances indicate interrelation. In case 
of the analysis of joint supplier and customer collaboration (Hypothesis 3), the past ‘state’ 
indicating persistence is past engagement in supplier and customer alliances jointly. To examine 
interrelation in this model, we include, in addition to past involvement in competitor alliances, 
past engagement in single alliance strategies with customers or suppliers (alliance with 
customers but not with suppliers, and vice versa). This avoids overlap with the persistence effect 
of supplier-customer strategies as these variables are orthogonal to joint supplier and customer 
alliances.5 At the same time, it allows examining the transition from partial vertical alliance 
strategies (collaboration only with customers or only with suppliers) to integrated vertical 
alliance strategies.  
As control variables, we include R&D intensity (the share of R&D employees in total 
employment) and its squared term. R&D engagement increases a firm’s capacity to recognize, 
value and assimilate external knowledge from alliance partners (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 
1998; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). In this way, more R&D-intensive firms are also more likely to 
engage in several technological collaboration projects but with diminishing propensity 
(Belderbos et al, 2004b). The analysis also controls for firm size. The literature indicates that the 
size of companies plays a role in propensity to be engaged in collaboration. Larger firms have 
more abundant resources and may find it less problematic to handle multiple innovation 
objectives and management of multiple technology collaborations (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2006; 
Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Harrigan, 1988). We include the logarithm of the number of 
employees. R&D intensity and firm size are taken from the (t-2) survey.  We also include firm 
                                                 
5
 Since we do not examine interaction effects, we avoid the issue of calculating cross derivatives in  nonlinear 
models such as probit (e.g. Hoetker, 2007; Ai, and Norton. 2003). 
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age. Older companies tend to be more experienced and will have well-established routines in 
place (Nelson and Winter, 1982; March, 1988), also specifically geared to collaboration, which 
may positively affect their propensity to be engaged in collaboration. On the other hand, well-
established routines and abundant experience may also make that firms tend to become more 
self-reliant (Tidd et al., 2005), which reduces their propensity to be engaged in external 
collaboration. Furthermore, we control for whether the firm is an affiliate of a foreign 
multinational firm or part of a larger (domestic grouping). Firms that are part of a larger group 
may draw on group financial and technological resources and reputation to make them more 
attractive as cooperation partners and to support collaborative efforts (e.g. Ahuja, 2000). At the 
same time such firms may have fewer incentives to cooperate with outside partners, as they are 
likely to have intra-group R&D collaboration opportunities. 
Finally we include a set of time dummies, industry dummies at the ISIC-2 level as the 
need for technology collaboration and the use of particular alliances types may differ across 
industries and across years, and eleven region (province) dummies as the opportunity for 
collaboration arising from, for instance, differences with regard to innovation activity or 
clustering of suppliers may vary systematically across locations (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Fritsch, 2004).  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 provides the variable definitions and their descriptive statistics and Table 2 lists 
correlations between the variables used in the estimation. Table 1 indicates that supplier 
collaboration is most frequently adopted, with 13.1 % of the cases, followed by customer 
collaboration (10.1 %) and competitor collaboration (6.6 % cases). In addition, 8.3% of the firms 
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are engaged in both supplier and customer collaboration, indicating a relatively frequent use of 
such combined supplier and customer alliances. The percentages are comparable for current and 
past alliances. The R&D intensity of the firms in the sample is on average 3.1 percent. The 
correlation table (Table 2) indicates the highest correlation between concurrent supplier and 
customer variables (69%), a much smaller correlation between current and lagged alliances, and 
a positive but small correlation between vertical and horizontal alliances. Firm size and R&D are 
positively correlated with alliances with each partner type. The table does not indicate 
multicollinearity problems for the set of independent variables, Apart from the naturally high 
correlation between R&D and its square term and the negative correlation between the 
orthogonal group affiliation and MNE affiliation dummies, the highest correlation coefficient is 
0.59.6 
------------------------------- 
Insert table1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert table2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
Empirical Methods 
 In order to analyze the determinants of the propensity to be engaged  in collaboration with 
the three types of partners, we estimate a multivariate probit model with the dummy variables 
‘competitor alliance’, ‘customer alliance’ and ‘supplier alliance’ as dependent variables. The 
error terms of the three individual probit equations are likely to be correlated if firms are 
simultaneously considering decisions to engage in the three types of alliances. Use of the 
                                                 
6
 We also examined multicollinearity through the condition number of the matrix of regressors. This statistic (the 
ratio of largest to smallest eigenvalue) is an unbounded measure of collinearity, or ill-conditioning, in the data 
(Belsley, 1991). These diagnostic measures did not indicate problems of collinear regressors in our models. 
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multivariate probit model in which we simultaneously estimate the propensity to be engaged in 
collaboration with the three partner types addresses this problem and leads to an improvement in 
the efficiency of the estimates.  
 Given that we analyze unbalanced panel data, we also estimated probit equations for each 
alliance type using panel probit estimators with random effects.7 The estimates from these 
individual equations are consistent, albeit not efficient because they do not take correlation 
between equations into account. We used likelihood ratio test to test the significance of the 
panel-level variance component (rho) in the total variance. In the customer and competitor 
equations we could not reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero at any conventional level. In the 
supplier equation the null hypothesis could not be rejected at the 5 percent level but was just 
rejected at the 10 percent level. Overall, these results indicate that the panel-level variance 
component is only of marginal importance and that the pooled multivariate probit estimators are 
to be preferred over the random effects estimator. The implication is that we could proceed by 
estimating the equations as a multivariate probit system. The system of equations is given in  
equation (1).  
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            (1) 
where i indexes firms and t years, accordingly; 1,ity ,  2,ity , and 3,ity  are the binary indicators 
which take the value one if a firm reported to be engaged in an alliance with customers, suppliers 
and competitors, respectively, and zero otherwise. CUS, SUP, and COM measure alliance 
                                                 
7
 Fixed effects probit estimator produces inconsistent estimates due to so called 'incidental parameters problem' 
(Green, 2002; Wooldridge, 2002, p. 484). 
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engagement in the previous two surveys: t-2 refers to the survey 2 years before and t-4 refers to 
the survey 4 years before. The size and significance of the coefficients on the past alliance for the 
same type variables indicate how persistent alliances with each partner type are. Specifically, 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that past (t-2, t-4) CUStomer, SUPplier, and COMpetiror have a positive 
impact on engagement in the same alliances at time t. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the t-2 and t-4 
past alliance engagement coefficients are larger in the customer equation than in the supplier 
equation. Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive effect of past CUStomer on current SUPplier alliances, 
and past SUPplier on current CUStomer alliances. Hypothesis 5 predicts a primarily lagged 
effect (t-4) of COMpetitor on SUPplier and CUStomer alliances. 
 The error term itω in equation 1 is assumed to be random in each of the three equations, and 
the vector Z contains our control variables. The coefficients to be estimated, k,1β  through k,6β , 
are not constrained across the three equations, but the model allows us to test whether the 
determinants of the propensity to form alliances of each type are significantly different across 
equations.8 
 In order to test for persistence of joint supplier and customer technology alliances 
(Hypothesis 4), we estimated a separate probit model with this joint collaboration as a dependent 
variable. It is not possible to estimate this supplier-customer equation jointly with the single 
alliance equations in the multivariate probit model because the dependent variable is a function 
of two other dependent variables in the model (customer alliances, supplier alliances).  
An important issue in the empirical analysis is potential endogeneity biasing our results. 
It has been noted that this type of selection bias is of particular importance in performance 
                                                 
8
 We use the GHK simulated maximum likelihood estimator; results are obtained with a Stata CMP routine. 
Hajivassiliou et al. (1996) prove that under regularity conditions the simulated maximum likelihood estimator is 
consistent when both the number of draws and observations goes to infinity 
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studies since managers’ decisions are endogenous to their expected performance outcomes 
(Hamilton and Nickerson, 2006; Leiblein et al; 2002; Shaver, 1998). In the context of our 
analysis, it is possible that some unobserved firm specific factors affect the propensity to be 
engaged in alliances and/or specific alliance types, such that firms are ‘selected in’ alliance 
engagement. The effect of past engagement in alliances with specific partner types on the current 
probability to be engaged in alliances with specific partner types then could in theory be a 
corollary of this selection effect rather than a real persistence effect. In our analysis, we expect 
this bias to be limited or non-existent, for a number of reasons. First, potential selection effects 
due to unobserved heterogeneity are mitigated by the use of a wide set of firm-specific control 
variables that affect the propensity to be engaged in specific alliance types. Second, while a 
remaining selection effects cannot be ruled out, this may potentially lead to an upward bias in the 
persistence effects, but it is not evident why it would lead to systematic differences in persistence 
across alliance partners, nor is it evident that this should affect patterns of interrelation between 
alliance engagement with different partners. The latter are the core hypotheses of our paper. 
Third, one would expect that estimation with firm individual effects would control for the 
relevant unobserved firm characteristics that may drive longer term selection into alliance types. 
As we note in the paper, tests of random effect estimators show that these random effects are 
jointly insignificant (the random effects model is rejected in favor of the multivariate probit), 
again suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity leading to selection is not likely to bias our 
results. 
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EMPRICAL RESULTS 
 Table 3 reports the results from the multivariate probit explaining the propensity of firms to 
be engaged in technology alliances with the three types of partners. Table 4 contains the results 
of a separate probit model explaining the propensity to be engaged in value chain spanning 
vertical alliances (supplier and customer alliances combined).  
 A first observation from Table 3 is that the correlation coefficients of the error terms in the 
multivariate probit model (Rho) are positive, ranging from 0.5 to 0.8, and highly significant. This 
supports the notion of interdependence between the decisions to be engaged in collaboration with 
different partner types and confirms the need to use the simultaneous equations approach.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 The coefficients on the corresponding past alliance variable for t-2 (listed on the diagonal 
of Table 3) are highly significant in each of the three equations. In addition, the coefficient on (t-
4) is significant in the customer and competitor equations, but not in the supplier equation. These 
results corroborate hypothesis 1: previous engagement in alliances with a specific type of partner 
(customer, supplier, and competitor) increases the propensity to be engaged in alliances with that 
partner type. The results indicate that collaboration with each of the three partner types is 
persistent, but in different degrees. Specifically, our findings provide evidence for hypothesis 2. 
Past customer alliances at both t-2 and t-4 affects current engagement in customer collaboration, 
whereas for suppliers this only applies to t-2. We tested this more formally: a Wald test rejects 
(p<0.01) the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on the t-2 and t-4 own lagged terms 
in the customer and supplier equations, respectively is equal.  
 The results in Table 3 also show positive interrelation effects between supplier and 
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customer cooperation. Supplier alliances in t-2 have a significantly positive impact on the 
propensity to be engaged in customer alliances, and vice versa. In addition, past customer 
alliances in t-4 have an additional positive impact on engagement in supplier alliances, while 
there is no significant effect of supplier alliances (t-4) on customer alliances. These results 
support hypothesis 3, which stated that previous engagement in supplier alliances increases the 
propensity to be engaged in customer alliances, and vice versa. In addition, there is additional 
evidence in support of hypothesis 3 in the equation with joint supplier and customer alliance 
engagement as the dependent variable (Table 4). Here past (t-2) alliance engagement only with 
customers or only with suppliers has a positive impact on simultaneous engagement in alliances 
with suppliers and customers. In addition, t-4 engagement in only customer alliances positively 
affects the propensity of engagement in current joint customer-supplier alliances. Hence, firms 
engaged in supplier (customer) collaboration are likely to add customer (supplier) cooperation in 
a subsequent period. These results again show a positive interrelation between alliances with 
both partner types, with overall the strongest and consistent impact found for recent past 
alliances (t-2). 
 The results in Table 4 also provide support for Hypothesis 4. The results of the probit 
model explaining engagement in vertical alliances (joint customer and supplier alliance) show 
that past engagement in joint collaboration in both t-2 and t-4 has a positive and highly 
significant (p<0.01) impact on current engagement in vertical collaboration. The coefficients on 
the past joint terms suggest that their combined effect is 20-30 percent higher than the combined 
effect of the t-2 and t-4 coefficients measuring persistence of individual alliances with suppliers 
or customers in Table 3. We tested this difference formally using Wald tests (e.g., Clogg et al., 
1995). A two-sided test rejected the null hypothesis of equivalence of the coefficients in the 
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customer equation (Table 3, column 1), the supplier equation (Table 3, column 2) and the 
competitor equation (Table 3, column 3) with p-values < 0.01. Overall, these results provide 
strong support for Hypothesis 4, which predicted simultaneous engagement in alliances with 
suppliers and customers to be more persistent than engagement in alliances with only suppliers 
or only customers.  
 Turning to the test for Hypothesis 5, the results show that recent past (t-2) competitor 
alliances (t-2) have no impact on the propensity to be engaged in supplier or customer alliances 
(Table 3), nor on the propensity of engagement in supplier and customer alliances 
simultaneously (Table 4). In contrast, if we examine past alliances with a longer lag (t-4), the 
results do show a significant impact of past competitor alliances on the propensity to be engaged 
in alliances with suppliers or customers (Table 3), as well as on engagement in alliances with 
suppliers and customers simultaneously (Table 4). These results all provide strong support for 
Hypothesis 5: past engagement in alliances with competitors increases the propensity to be 
engaged in alliances with customers and suppliers, but this interrelation effect only occurs with a 
longer lag (t-4) when compared to the interrelationship between collaboration with suppliers and 
customers (which is strongest for t-2). In sensitivity tests, we also examined the impact of an 
even longer lag between horizontal and vertical alliances, including the variable horizontal 
alliance engagement in t-6. Such a test requires data on firms in four consecutive surveys, and 
this more than halves our sample given the underlying sampling process. Competitor 
collaboration in t-6 was not significant in any of the equations, while the positive and significant 
coefficients of horizontal alliance engagement in t-4 remained robust. Hence, the empirical 
regularities seem to point to an effective lag of roughly 4 years.  
 The empirical results also show additional positive effects of past customer alliances with a 
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longer lag (t-4) and of recent past supplier alliances (t-2) on the propensity to be engaged in 
competitor alliances. Although the literature did not provide specific guidance on the 
interrelation from vertical to horizontal collaboration, these are interesting findings to which we 
will return when discussing avenues for future research.  
     Among the control variables, firm size is positive and significant in each of the equations. 
The effect of R&D intensity on the propensity to be engaged in technology alliances is 
curvilinear in all equations, with a declining marginal impact for high R&D intensities. Age 
carries a small, negative effect that may reflect a decreasing propensity to be engaged in external, 
innovation-based collaboration when firms age. Firms that are part of a foreign multinational or a 
domestic group generally have a greater propensity to be engaged in alliances. Location also 
matters: the likelihood-ratio test rejects the constrained specification in which location (province) 
dummies are jointly set to zero, in favor of the specification with the province dummies (LR = 
510.83, p-value< 0.001).9 In addition, the time and industry dummies (not reported) are jointly 
significant: the likelihood-ratio test rejects the constrained specification, in which time and 
industry dummies are jointly set to zero, in favor of the specification with the dummies (LR = 
618.42, p-value<0.001)10. To test whether there are also differential effects of the past alliance 
variables between manufacturing and service firms, we applied a Chow test (e.g., Gujarati, 2005, 
p. 275) by including 6 interaction effects in each equation between a service dummy and the past 
alliance strategies. The likelihood ratio test (15.29, p-value=0.64) could not reject the null 
hypothesis these interaction effects are jointly zero. This suggests that there are no systematic 
                                                 
9
 In particular, firms located in less populated areas such as provinces in the north of the country, appeared  less 
likely to be engaged in R&D collaboration. 
10
 To test whether there are differential slope coefficients on past alliance variables between manufacturing and 
service firms we applied a Chow test (e.g., Gujarati, p. 513) by including 6 interaction effects in each equation 
between a service dummy and the past alliance strategies. The likelihood ratio test (15.29, p-value=0.64) could not 
reject the null hypothesis at any conventional level of significance that these interaction effects are jointly zero. This 
suggests that there are no systematic differences in the role of persistence and interrelation between the 
manufacturing and services industries in our sample. 
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differences in the role of persistence and interrelation between the manufacturing and services 
industries in our sample. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper examined to what extent there is persistence in alliance engagement with 
different partner types (customers, suppliers, competitors) and to what degree alliance 
engagement with different partner types is interrelated. Empirical tests on a large panel set of 
innovating firms in the Netherlands provided support for the baseline hypothesis that alliances 
with individual partner types are persistent, that is: past engagement in alliances with a partner 
type predicts the propensity to be engaged in this type of alliance currently. While alliance 
engagement proves persistent for all three partner types, different types of alliances exhibit 
different degrees of persistence. Customer alliances are most persistent and significantly more so 
than supplier alliances. Whereas persistence of collaboration with suppliers may be attractive for 
the focal firm, the risk of spillovers and its corresponding remedial measures may reduce this 
propensity to some degree. In collaboration with customers though, this spillover risk may be 
outweighed by the strategic value of access to (scarce) information on specific customer needs 
and the higher likelihood of initial market acceptance and (future) commercial success, 
enhancing persistence of customer alliances.  
 Our study also demonstrated important interrelations between the three alliance types: prior 
engagement in alliances with one partner type affects the propensity to be engaged in alliances of 
another type. Here, our analysis confirmed an important interrelation between the two types of 
vertical alliances (collaboration with suppliers and customers). We found positive effects of past 
supplier collaboration on customer collaboration and vice versa. In addition, the strongest and 
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most significant persistence was found for joint supplier and customer alliance engagement. 
Such joint collaboration brings a focal firm in a better position for information exchange and 
resource (re)combination, while it also enhances opportunities for monitoring partner behavior 
and reputation building. This increases the likelihood that jointly developed capabilities and 
routines become more difficult to imitate and/or substitute, which contributes to the build-up of 
competitive advantage that is longer lived (Priem and Butler, 2001). This result is in line with 
earlier findings that firms persistently pursuing an integrative collaborative strategy across the 
value chain, with suppliers and customers, tend to exhibit superior performance (Narasimhan and 
Jayaram, 1998; Vickery et al., 2003; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001; Rosenzweig et al., 2003).  
 Our study also revealed a very specific interrelation between horizontal and vertical  
alliance strategies. We observed a specific pattern that is in line with the idea of a ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ strategy to combine exploration and exploitation through a temporal separation 
between the two activities (Burgelman, 2002; Levinthal and March, 1993; Gupta et al., 2006). 
Prior engagement in horizontal alliances consistently affected the propensity of engagement in 
supplier and/or customer alliance with a longer (4 years) lag, while no impact was found for 
effects with a shorter lag (2 years). This contrasted with strong effects of immediate past 
customer (supplier) alliances (t-2) on current supplier (customer) alliances. These findings are in 
line with our arguments that a longer lag allows for a sequence of discovery and experimentation 
in horizontal collaboration followed by upscaling and commercialization in vertical collaboration 
in such a way that governance risks can be mitigated while combinatory resource benefits can 
still be reaped. These considerations do not play a role in the case of interrelation between 
supplier and customer alliances. Here, a longer lag would cause a delay that inhibits the 
37 
 
 
 
alignment of collaboration with suppliers and customers that is required for accomplishing the 
strategic objectives of vertical collaboration.  
 In conclusion, our findings are highly supportive of the idea that alliance engagement 
with different partner types is interrelated. This is an interesting new insight that stands in 
contrast with the compartmentalized approach taken in most of the literature until now. Prior 
studies have often tended to focus on one type of alliances at a time or have implicitly considered 
horizontal alliances and vertical alliances as unrelated. Instead, our study shows that differences 
in partner attributes along partner types do matter and should not be ignored, as evident 
interdependencies operate across them.  
 We see our study contributing to the literature along several lines. First, while 
interdependencies between alliances engagement with different partner types have been studied 
in the portfolio approach to alliances (Vassolo et al, 2004; Wassner, 2009; Lokshin and Duysters, 
2008), relationships between alliances with different partner types have not received due 
attention in prior studies. Our results may provide further reflection on the portfolio approach to 
alliances and inter-firm collaboration. Our analysis of joint customer-supplier technology 
alliances is informative of the process of alliance engagement resulting in the creation of alliance 
portfolios (how they come into being). Our findings may suggest that supplier collaboration or 
customer collaboration strategies are likely to be followed by an expansion of collaboration to 
include collaboration with the other vertical partner type, due to the synergistic effects between 
them. The process of alliance portfolio creation and the gradual evolvement of portfolios have 
been understudied and is an interesting avenue for future research (Hoffman, 2007; Wassmer, 
2009). At the same time, our findings suggest that horizontal alliance strategies may be less 
likely to evolve into more differentiated alliance portfolio strategies. What our analysis suggests 
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is that while the portfolio approach examines simultaneous strategies, some particular alliance 
configurations may be more effective if combined in a more sequential manner, to reduce 
governance risks and to avoid conflict. This is partially related to the notion of sub-additivity or 
conflict in alliance portfolios (Vassolo et al, 2004; Wassmer, 2009) where combining certain 
types of alliances may lead to suboptimal results. Yet our study suggests that in some cases, 
alternating alliance strategies and an inter-temporal portfolio approach may solve such issues 
related to simultaneous alliance engagement. The understanding of the role of such 
interdependencies is important as they serve as critical determinants for the extent in which a 
firm derives value from its portfolio (Wassmer, 2009). Clearly, combining an inter-temporal and 
simultaneous dimension of alliance portfolios suggests a promising avenue for future research. 
Our study also reflects on the network perspective on alliances. Whereas our findings are in line 
with the general wisdom that firms sharing strategic interdependence are more likely to engage 
in alliances when compared to non-interdependent firms (Gulati, 1995; Stuart, 1998; Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2002), our study extends this commonly held idea in a number of 
ways. First, we go beyond the general notion of strategic interdependence by specifying its 
differences among partner types. Second, our finding that alliance engagement with different 
partner types is interrelated, indicates that persistence of alliance engagement with a specific 
partner type is not only shaped by bilateral dependence but also by interdependence with other 
partner types. Whereas until now collaboration has been considered as operating between firms 
from only two interdependent ‘strategic groups’ (Gulati, 1995), our findings suggest that alliance 
engagement is also affected by other strategic groups from which different partner types 
originate. Third, our study adds to a better understanding of how interrelationships between 
alliances types and time elapsed are related. Specifically, we found that the effect of past 
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engagement in horizontal alliances on current vertical collaboration only operated with a longer 
lag. Hence, a degree of delay can increase the propensity to be engaged in vertical collaboration 
rather than reduce it. This finding is consonant to the curvilinear effect of time elapsed on 
alliance formation found in pioneering work by Gulati (1995b). Whilst this effect was 
unexpected from a network embeddedness perspective in his study, the combination of a 
competence and governance perspective as taken in our study suggests that some delay enables 
to mitigate risks whereas too much delay sacrifices combinatory benefits.11  
  A final contribution relates to our approach to employ both a competence and 
governance view of strategic collaboration in order to shed more light on the extent to which risk 
profiles of different partner types interact with their resource complementarity. Here, we found 
that for persistence of vertical collaboration or horizontal collaboration the two perspectives are 
complementary as they suggest a similar effect on the propensity to be engaged in collaboration 
with vertical or horizontal partner types respectively. In contrast, when considering the 
interrelation between horizontal and vertical collaboration, we found that they form competing 
perspectives as they imply opposed effects on the propensity to be engaged in collaboration with 
another type. Hence, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the two perspectives 
can be both complementary and rival as far as strategic collaboration is concerned, depending on 
whether vertical and horizontal collaboration are considered apart or together.  
  Our research has a number of limitations, which should be addressed in future work. An 
important limitation was that the panel data set used does not identify alliance partners by name, 
such that we could not distinguish whether persistence is with the same or different firms within 
alliances types. The arguments that we proposed for same partner type persistence is broader and 
                                                 
11
 Interestingly enough, the optimum delay that he finds is approx. 3.8 years. This is very close to the four year lag 
that we found to be robust in our analysis.   
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relates to strategic collaboration needs and governance with a category of partners, within which 
firms may substitute a specific partner firm. A different research approach utilizing longitudinal 
datasets identifying partner names as well as partner types would allow examining differences in 
persistence across the same type and for the same partner. Another issue for future research 
relates to the ‘reverse’ positive effects found for past customer alliances (t-4) and recent past 
supplier alliances (t-2) on the propensity to be engaged in competitor alliances, which was not 
covered by our theory and hypotheses. An understanding of these effects would require first of 
all an understanding from how exploitation leads to exploration. This forms a largely unexplored 
issue in the literature until now as in most studies it has been considered how radical 
(technological) change impacts on established firms in an industry (Christensen, 1997; Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986; Tripsas, 1997), but leaves unexplained in how far such radical changes 
have their origins in current practices and technologies (Nooteboom, 2000). Although our 
empirical findings seem to indicate that such a relationship might be present, a more in-depth 
understanding of how exploration may potentially build on exploitation is required before we are 
able to predict how previous engagement in vertical collaboration increases the propensity to be 
engaged in horizontal collaboration.  
 Overall, our study provides new insights into the role and effects of dependencies across 
a firm’s partner types, a largely overlooked issue in the literature until now (Lavie, 2007). This 
complements the network approach that, due to its focus on network structural properties, has 
ignored the role of partner attributes and the role of a differential propensity of engagement in 
collaboration with different partner types. Our study also complements the portfolio approach to 
alliances, by broadening the perspective to inter-temporal relationships between different 
alliances, and by examining relationships between three functional types of alliances.  A 
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combined use of a competence and governance view has proven to be useful for a more profound 
understanding of the degree to which collaboration with different partner types is persistent, as 
well as in how far collaboration with different partner types is interrelated.  
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TABLE 1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean SD 
Dependent variables     
Customer alliance 
(CUS) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with customers, else 0 
0.10 0.30 
Supplier alliance 
(SUP) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with suppliers, else 0 
0.13 0.34 
Competitor alliance  
(COM) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with competitors, else 0  
0.07 
 
0.25 
Customer & supplier alliance 
(CUS & SUP) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with customer and suppliers, else 0 
0.08 0.27 
Independent variable model Is     
Past customer alliance (t-2) 
(CUSt-2) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with customers two years ago, else 0 
0.10 0.30 
Past customer alliance (t-4) 
(CUSt-4) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with customers four years ago, else 0 
0.09 0.29 
Past supplier alliance (t-2) 
(SUPt-2) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with suppliers two years ago, else 0 
0.12 0.33 
Past supplier alliance (t-4) 
(SUPt-4) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with suppliers four years ago, else 0 
0.11 0.31 
Past competitor alliance (t-2) 
(COMt-2) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with competitors two years ago, else 0  
0.07 0.25 
Past competitor alliance (t-4) 
(COMt-4) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with competitors four years ago, else 0 
0.07 0.25 
R&D intensity (t-2) (R&Dt-2) R&D intensity; share of R&D employees in total 
employment  
0.03 0.17 
R&D intensity squared (t-2) 
(R&Dsqt-2) 
R&D intensity; share of R&D employees in total 
employment squared 
0.03 1.40 
Firm size (t-2) (SIZEt-2) Logarithm of number of employees 4.81 1.04 
Firm age Firm age, in years 26.27 10.7
8 
Part of a domestic group 1 if the firm is part of a domestic corporate group, else 0 0.51 0.49 
Foreign multinational 1 if headquarters of the firm is located outside the 
Netherlands, else 0 
0.34 0.47 
Independent variables model II    
Past customer & supplier 
alliance (t-2) (CUS & SUPt-2) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with customer and suppliers two years ago, 
else 0 
0.07 0.25 
Past customer & supplier 
alliance (t-4) (CUS & SUPt-4) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with customer and suppliers four years ago, 
else 0 
0.07 0.23 
Past customer only alliance (t-2) 
(CUSt-2) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with customers (but not suppliers) two years 
ago, else 0 
0.03 0.16 
Past customer only alliance (t-4) 
(CUSt-4) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with customers (but not suppliers)four years 
ago, else 0 
0.04 0.19 
Past supplier only alliance (t-2) 1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 0.05 0.22 
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(SUPt-2) partnership with suppliers (but not customers) two years 
ago, else 0 
Past supplier only alliance (t-4) 
(SUPt-4) 
1 if the firm reported it was engaged in active R&D 
partnership with suppliers (but not customers) four years 
ago, else 0 
0.05 0.21 
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TABLE 2a Correlation matrix among variables used in model I (N=4632) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 16 15 
1 CUSt; 1.00              
2 SUPt 0.68 1.00             
3 COMt 0.56 0.53 1.00            
4 CUSt-2 0.20 0.19 0.12 1.00           
5 CUSt-4 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.16 1.00          
6 SUPt-2 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.59 0.14 1.00         
7 SUPt-4 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.51 0.17 1.00        
8 COMt-2 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.51 0.09 0.48 0.10 1.00       
9 COMt-4 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.40 0.07 0.38 0.14 1.00      
10 R&Dt-2 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.12 1.00     
11 R&Dsqt-2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.87 1.00    
12 SIZEt-2 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.03 1.00   
13 MNEt 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.09 1.00  
14 DOM GROUPt 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.73 1.00 
15 AGEt -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 
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TABLE 2b Correlation matrix among variables used in model II (N=4632) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 16 15 
1 CUS&SUPt; 1.00              
2 CUS_SUPt-2 0.20 1.00             
3 CUS_SUPt-4; 0.11 0.10 1.00            
4 CUS_Onlyt-2 0.04 -0.05 0.06 1.00           
5 CUS_Onlyt-4 0.10 0.04 -0.05 0.12 1.00          
6 SUP_Onlyt-2 0.09 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.06 1.00         
7 SUP_Onlyt-4 0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.09 1.00        
8 COMt-2 0.15 0.53 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.07 1.00       
9 COMt-4 0.09 0.05 0.38 0.09 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.14 1.00      
10 R&Dt-2 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.12 1.00     
11 R&Dsqt-2 0.00 0.06 0.06 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.87 1.00    
12 SIZEt-2 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.03 1.00   
13 MNEt 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.09 1.00  
14 DOM GROUPt 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.73 1.00 
15 AGEt -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 
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TABLE 3 
Multivariate probit analysis of the propensity to form technology alliances 
 Customer 
alliance 
Supplier 
Alliance 
Competitor 
alliance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CUSt-2 (Customer alliance in t-2) 0.34*** 
(0.07) 
0.13† 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
CUSt-4 (Customer alliance in t-4) 0.50*** 
(0.11) 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.41** 
(0.14) 
SUPt-2 (Supplier alliance in t-2) 0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.33*** 
(0.07) 
0.16† 
(0.08) 
SUPt-4 (Supplier alliance in t-4) -0.06 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
COMt-2 (Competitor alliance in t-2) 0.08 
(0.12) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
COMt-4 (Competitor alliance in t-4) 0.21* 
(0.10) 
0.24** 
(0.07) 
0.15† 
(0.09) 
 R&Dt-2 (R&D intensity in t-2) 3.41*** 
(0.68) 
3.11** 
(0.66) 
3.14*** 
(0.46) 
R&Dsqt-2 (R&D intensity squared in t-2) -1.67** 
(0.65) 
-1.51* 
(0.64) 
-1.48*** 
(0.51) 
SIZEt-2 (Firm size in t-2) 0.21*** 
(0.03) 
0.23*** 
(0.03) 
0.23*** 
(0.03) 
AGEt (Firm age in t) 
 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
MNEt (MNE in t) 
 
0.25** 
(0.08) 
0.27*** 
(0.10) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
DOM GROUPt (part of domestic group in t) 0.15* 
(0.06) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
Constant -3.76*** 
(0.21) 
-3.17*** 
(0.24) 
-3.41*** 
(0.19) 
Rho/2 0.88*** 
(0.02) 
  
Rho/3 0.81*** 
(0.03) 
0.79*** 
(0.03) 
 
Time dummies Included Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Location (province) dummies Included Included Included 
Number of firms 3181 3181 3181 
Number of observations 4632 4632 4632 
Wald )39(2χ , p-value< 0.001 671.49   
Log-likelihood  -2581.53   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
† p<0.1 (Significant at 10% level) 
* p<0.05 (Significant at 5% level) 
** p< 0.01 (Significant at 1% level) 
*** p< 0.001  (Significant at 0.1% level) 
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TABLE 4 
Probit analysis of the propensity to form customer & supplier technology alliances 
 Customer & Supplier Alliance 
Past alliance with:  
CUS_SUPt-2 (Customer & supplier alliances in t-2) 0.67*** 
(0.11) 
CUS_SUPt-4 (Customer & supplier alliances in t-4) 0.41** 
(0.14) 
CUS_Onlyt-2  (Customer alliance only in t-2) 0.47** 
(0.18) 
CUS_Onlyt-4  (Customer alliance only in t-4) 0.60*** 
(0.16) 
SUP_Onlyt-2 (Supplier alliance only in t-2) 0.34** 
(0.13) 
SUP_Onlyt-4 (Supplier alliance only in t-4) 0.03 
(0.13) 
COMt-2 (Competitor alliance in t-2) 0.12 
(0.11) 
COMt-4 (Competitor alliance in t-4) 0.23* 
(0.09) 
 R&Dt-2 (R&D intensity in t-2) 2.29*** 
(0.57) 
R&Dsqt-2 (R&D intensity squared in t-2) -1.00* 
(0.49) 
SIZEt-2 (Firm size in t-2) 0.21*** 
(0.03) 
AGEt (Firm age in t) 
 
-0.01† 
(0.00) 
MNEt (MNE in t) 
 
0.13 
(0.09) 
DOM GROUPt (part of domestic group in t) 
 
0.11 
(0.07) 
Constant -4.65*** 
(0.30) 
Time dummies Included 
Industry dummies Included 
Location (province) dummies‡ Included 
Number of firms 3181 
Number of observations 4632 
Wald )41(2χ , p-value< 0.001 752.44 
Log-likelihood  -935.50 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
† p<0.1 (Significant at 10% level) 
* p<0.05 (Significant at 5% level) 
** p< 0.01 (Significant at 1% level) 
*** p< 0.001  (Significant at 0.1% level) 
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